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 Abstract:  This article examines the effect of campaign-style anticorruption efforts on political support using the case of 
China ’ s most recent anticorruption drive, which stands out for its harsh crackdown on high-ranking officials, known 
as “big tigers.” An exploratory text analysis of more than 370,000 online comments on the downfall of the first 100 
big tigers, from 2012 to 2015, reveals that public support for the top national leader who initiated the anticorruption 
campaign significantly exceeded that afforded to anticorruption agencies and institutions. Further regression analyses 
show that support for the leaders with respect to intuitions increased with the tigers ’ party ranking. Findings suggest 
that while campaign-style enforcement can reinforce the central authority and magnify support for individual leaders, 
it may also marginalize the role of legal institutions crucial to long-term corruption control . 
 Evidence for Practice 
•  Public support is an important indicator to monitor during anticorruption campaigns, in addition to 
corruption control. 
•  To comprehensively understand public opinion, it is necessary to separate political support into multiple 
dimensions. 
•  Anticorruption campaigns can generally help boost public support, especially support for top leaders. 
•  Policy makers ought to wield authority amassed through the campaign to promote institution building in 
order to achieve desired policy outcomes in the long run. 
 Corruption has detrimental effects on both economic well-being (Liu and Mikesell  2014 ; Liu, Moldogaziev, and Mikesell  2017 ; Rose-
Ackerman  1999 ) and public trust in government 
(Seligson  2002 ; Villoria, Van Ryzin, and Lavena 
 2013 ). Previous research has examined a wide array 
of anticorruption strategies, such as increasing 
government transparency (Brunetti and Weder  2003 ; 
Cordis and Warren  2014 ), streamlining and reforming 
government (Goel and Nelson  1998 ; Neshkova and 
Kostadinova  2012 ), building strong anticorruption 
agencies (Klitgaard  1988 ; Quah  2011 ), and improving 
bureaucrats ’ quality and integrity by promoting civil 
servants ’ material incentives and intrinsic motivation 
(Azfar and Nelson  2007 ; Perry  1996 ; Perry and 
Hondeghem  2008 ). These measures are conducive to 
the quality of long-term governance. However, their 
implementation is often accompanied by difficulties 
such as a paucity of resources, information asymmetry, 
and institutional inertia (Wedeman  2005 ). Thus, 
political leaders, especially those in the developing 
world, often resort to less institutionalized means, 
in particular anticorruption campaigns, to fight 
corruption. 
 Driven by strong political will and often bypassing 
formal legal institutions, anticorruption campaigns 
tend to feature temporary intensive enforcement, such 
as revealing outrageous corruption cases and cracking 
down on high-ranking officials. Thus, eliminating 
corrupt officials tends to be presumed as the primary 
goal of campaigns. However, the broader sociopolitical 
repercussions of such campaign-style enforcement are 
often overlooked. In fact, governments usually launch 
anticorruption campaigns not only to curb corruption 
but also to gain legitimacy and win political support 
(Gillespie and Okruhlik  1991 ). When corruption is 
serious and governments are in a trust crisis, political 
leaders are especially prone to look for quick solutions 
to recover public confidence. For example, Indonesia 
launched several corruption eradication campaigns to 
legitimize Suharto ’ s regime (Quah  1999 ). The Korean 
government also resorted to anticorruption campaigns 
to rebuild trust in government, which has declined in 
recent years (Yi  2015 ). 
 This article seeks to understand the extent to which 
anticorruption campaigns win public support, which 
is a critical factor for good governance and political 
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stability (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn  2000 ; Easton  1975 ; Li 
 2011 ; Muller and Jukam  1977 ). Even in nondemocratic states such 
as China, public support is an important source of legitimacy that 
can provide the political regime with leeway to maneuver when it 
encounters difficulties in its more immediate political tasks (Li  2013 ; 
Shi  2001 ). Loss of confidence can mean that people vote with their 
feet or push for a democratic system (Chen and Dickson  2008 ). 
 In particular, we examine social reactions to China ’ s most recent 
anticorruption drive, which was launched immediately after the 
18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012. 
The Chinese government has always considered anticorruption to 
be a major strategy for winning public support for the party and 
the government (Guo  2014 ; Manion  2004 ). For instance, in several 
speeches, Chinese president and general party secretary Xi Jinping 
emphasized that “people ’ s support is the greatest politics” and 
anticorruption is a major way to win support (Xinhua News Agency 
 2016 ). This latest campaign has hunted down a large number of 
“big tigers,” or high-ranking officials, and lasted a long time. Given 
these characteristics, we explore public support through online 
feedback using the big-data approach, which, in comparison with 
regular surveys, can monitor public opinion over a longer period 
of time and across a larger geographic space and is more open to a 
variety of subtle sentiments. 
 We collected netizens ’ comments from five popular websites 
between the end of 2012 and 2015, following the downfall of 
the “big tigers” (i.e., officials at or above the vice provincial level). 
We then analyzed the comments to examine the sentiments of 
public support for different political authorities that have been the 
locus of political support identified by the extant literature (Chen 
 2004 ; Dalton  1999 ; Dickson  2016 ; Easton  1975 ; Li  2013 ; Yang 
and Tang  2010 ). In comparison with the anticorruption agencies 
implementing the campaign and the formal institutions that work 
to contain corruption, the individual supreme leader of the state, 
Xi Jinping, is found to have won the most support. In other words, 
anticorruption campaigns may reinforce public support for the top 
leader at the cost of distracting or even undermining support for 
institution building, which is more fundamental to the long-term 
effective control of corruption. The findings suggest that political 
will not only is needed to initiate campaign-style anticorruption 
but also should be diverted toward institutions. Therefore, policy 
makers ought to wield their authority amassed through short-term 
anticorruption campaigns to promote institution building, such as 
reforming anticorruption agencies and rules both during and after 
anticorruption drives. 
 This article first discusses the concept of anticorruption campaigns 
and the background of China ’ s most recent anticorruption 
campaign. It then specifies where public support is lodged during 
anticorruption campaigns based on the literature on public trust. 
This is followed by a description of the data and method and 
illustrations of the major empirical findings. The last section 
summarizes conclusions from the analysis. 
 Anticorruption Campaigns: The Concept 
and the Chinese Context 
 Anticorruption campaigns are a form of campaign-style 
enforcement (Wedeman  2005 ). According to Liu et al.,  
campaign-style enforcement is “a type of policy implementation 
involving extraordinary mobilization of administrative resources 
under political sponsorship to achieve a specific policy target within 
a defined period of time” (2015, 85). Campaign-style enforcement 
is often adopted because of the failure of regular enforcement, 
resource scarcity (Wedeman  2005 ; Zhan, Lo, and Tang  2014 ), and 
the policy priority allocated by the government (Liu et al.  2015 ; 
May, Workman, and Jones  2008 ; Zhou  2012 ). As for anticorruption 
enforcement, in contrast to the institutionalized measures that 
are implemented as systematic strategies to monitor and deter 
corruption, anticorruption campaigns usually consist of “feverish 
crackdowns” (Wedeman  2009 , 15) on corruption and are ad hoc by 
nature (Chan and Gao  2009 ). Sometimes anticorruption campaigns 
also involve procedural and definitional excesses (Kennedy  1999 ), 
using radical and aggressive means of enforcement. 
 Chinese anticorruption campaigns are described by Manion ( 2004 ) 
as “several short bursts of intensive enforcement” that are usually 
“set in motion by top party and government leaders” through “a 
major escalation” of publicity in the Chinese press, condemning 
corruption and encouraging ordinary people to “report corruption 
and urging corrupt officials to confess their crimes.” To demonstrate 
its priority, the central party leaders also issue new demands “for 
greatly increased anticorruption criminal enforcement” (161). With 
intensive enforcement, the campaigns often end “with the requisite 
claims of success and statistics showing a dramatic increase in the 
number of cadres arrested and convicted” (Wedeman  2005 , 93). 
 Chinese anticorruption campaigns exhibit several salient features. 
First, the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dominates 
anticorruption efforts. In contrast to democracies such as the United 
States, which emphasize separation of powers and institutional 
division (Zhao and Peters  2009 ), in the one-party authoritarian 
Chinese state, the CCP controls cadre management across the 
state civil service, state enterprises, and institutes (Chan  2003 ). 
“The concept of governance in the People ’ s Republic of China 
is synonymous with the capability of the CCP to manage its 
political, economic, and social affairs” (Zhao and Peters  2009 , 
123). Thus, the CCP has led anticorruption work through its 
Central Disciplinary Inspection Committee (CDIC) (China ’ s 
primary anticorruption agency) and corresponding subnational 
committees. In terms of targets, unlike campaigns in the economic 
and environmental sectors (Guo and Foster  2008 ), anticorruption 
campaigns in China are more closely related to the internal 
problems of the ruling party and the government (Biddulph, 
Cooney, and Zhu  2012 ). Party leaders and government officials 
are the primary targets of the campaigns. Moreover, the campaigns 
are targeted toward greater numbers of officials, and more senior 
officials, than routine investigations. 
 Second, to mobilize administrative resources, campaigns may break 
down existing bureaucratic segmentation. Resource constraints 
(Wedeman  2005 ) and bureaucratic fragmentation (Zhou  2012 ) 
are two major factors hindering effective routine “police patrols” 
of corruption (Wedeman  2005 , 96). During anticorruption 
campaigns, resources can be redeployed from other policy areas 
in the manner of interagency and intergovernmental bureaucratic 
“coordinated operations” ( tongyi xingdong ) to achieve a burst of 
hyperenforcement (Biddulph, Cooney, and Zhu  2012 , 376; 
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Van Rooij  2006 ). In addition to regular anticorruption agencies, 
such as the CCP ’ s disciplinary inspection committees (DICs) 
and procuratorates, other government organizations such as audit 
bureaus, police departments, and taxation bureaus are often 
mobilized to facilitate investigations. Staff of other government 
departments may be borrowed by the DICs to add extra staff 
support. 
 Third, political will tends to outweigh legal procedures. Because of 
their political sponsorship, anticorruption campaigns, compared 
with other administrative and legal campaigns, are probably most 
similar to the prereform campaigns of the Mao era, although 
apparently less politicized and with less mass mobilization. 
Repressive means may be used to frighten people into lawful 
behavior to meet policy needs (Tanner  2005 ), and judicial 
procedures may be expedited to show government efficiency. 
Punishments are also tactically implemented with severe penalties 
imposed on some officials to demonstrate commitment to 
anticorruption, while clemency or reduced penalties are offered 
to other miscreants to boost the detection and capture rate 
(Manion  2004 ; Wedeman  2005 ). Finally, Chinese anticorruption 
campaigns are often driven by multiple purposes beyond controlling 
corruption. Prior research has indicated that anticorruption 
campaigns have often been designed to relieve public resentment 
(Guo  2014 ; Sun  2004 ) or even to cool down an overheating 
economy (Quade  2007 ). These features indicate that anticorruption 
campaigns are political implementation, according to Matland ’ s 
( 1995 ) contextual matrix of policy implementation. They possess 
sufficient resources and adequate power to achieve objectives 
that are otherwise unreachable through routine supervision of 
corruption. 
 The Unprecedented Anticorruption Campaign in China 
 China has seen at least six major anticorruption campaigns since 
1982 to cope with the corruption that has accompanied economic 
growth originating from market-oriented economic reform (Gong 
 2002 ; Manion  2016 ; Wedeman  2004 ). The anticorruption 
campaign launched by Xi Jinping in 2012 immediately after he 
became general party secretary, the topmost leadership position 
in China, is the most recent. Scholars have noticed significant 
differences from previous campaigns. First, Xi ’ s campaign has been 
of a much longer duration. It showed no signs of concluding by 
2016, whereas previous campaigns usually lasted a few months. 
Moreover, the intensity of enforcement within the campaign 
has been substantially augmented by the rising number of cases 
investigated and crackdowns on senior officials. A tremendous 
amount of public attention has been diverted toward Xi ’ s campaign, 
with extensive domestic and international media coverage 
dedicated to party leaders ’ anticorruption speeches, “breaking 
news” accompanying the apprehension of senior officials, and 
“breathtaking revelations” regarding officials ’ venality (Manion 
 2016 , 7). Finally, the number of investigations conducted by the 
CDIC and its subordinate branches during the current campaign 
has far surpassed any of the previous campaigns. 
 More importantly, the latest anticorruption campaign has been 
prominent in its attack on high-profile corruption committed 
by “big tigers,” or senior officials. For example, 161 officials at 
or above the provincial/ministerial level had been arrested by the 
end of 2015 (Kan  2015 ), as opposed to 151 provincial/ministerial 
level officials arrested during the 20 years between 1993 and 2012 
(Tencent  2016 ). Furthermore, to break down corrupt kingdoms 
that have become an eminent threat to the central authorities, the 
latest campaign has cracked down on “mega tigers,” or high-ranking 
officials at the national level, such as Zhou Yongkang, Ling Jihua, 
and Guo Boxiong. Moreover, Wang Qishan, appointed head of the 
CDIC in 2012, has used an iron fist in enforcing the campaign. 
Under Wang, the CDIC has tightened control over its local 
branches (Fu  2015 ). The inspection teams dispatched by the CDIC 
have also been rejuvenated to uncover corruption and supervise the 
implementation of discipline by increasing the number of teams 
and the frequency of inspections. All of the measures have helped 
strengthen the party center ’ s unified leadership and centralize 
available resources to carry out the anticorruption campaign. Thus, 
the latest anticorruption campaign has demonstrated in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms that it is more thoroughgoing 
than previous campaigns in China (Manion  2016 ). 
 However, anticorruption campaigns can also generate problems, 
which may have been aggravated by the unprecedented scale of the 
latest campaign. First, the extraordinary corruption cases of the “big 
tigers” might have shocked the public and undermined people ’ s 
trust in the party and government because many “big tigers” were 
political leaders in the top echelons of the party or the central 
government. 1 Second, by disrupting routine enforcement and 
reinforcing the party ’ s leadership over administrative bureaucracies, 
campaigns are actually in constant conflict with long-term 
institution building and the rule of law (Zhou  2012 ). For instance, 
policy portfolios under other government departments that are not 
prioritized may be completely suspended during a campaign to free 
up resources for campaign goals. 
 Moreover, because targets and the means of punishment enforced 
during campaigns tend to be selected for specific objectives, 
anticorruption investigations and disciplinary inspections are often 
“tools designed to serve political goals grounded on the shifting 
sands of political necessity. Fixed rules and legal institutions 
become ill-fitted to play a leading role, if any at all” (Fu  2015 , 
149). “Pragmatic political calculations loom large,” especially in 
high-profile cases, such as those regarding national-level leaders, 
rendering “no place for legality” or “morality more broadly” (Fu 
 2015 , 149). Thus, anticorruption campaigns often bypass legal 
procedures and marginalize legal institutions designed to control 
corruption. Anticorruption under Xi ’ s leadership has been suspected 
of being “reduced to an intra-party disciplinary matter” (Fu  2015 , 
139). Further, at the same time that legal institutions are attenuated, 
the decisive role of the central authority and the top leaders who 
initiated the campaign may be magnified through the campaign. 
Therefore, in consideration of both the achievements and the 
potential limitations of China ’ s unprecedented anticorruption 
campaign, we seek to systematically evaluate its effect on public 
support. 
 Lodging Public Support for the Anticorruption 
Campaign 
 A small but growing body of literature has explored what 
affects public opinion on anticorruption endeavors. Scholars 
find that people ’ s understanding of the definition, causes, and 
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consequences of corruption, for instance, greatly influences 
their tolerance and willingness to fight it (Gong, Wang and Ren 
 2015 ). Those who are unhappy with income disparity and the 
intrusion by political powers into the economy tend to hold high 
expectations for anticorruption reform and efficacy (Li, Gong, 
and Xiao  2016 ). Those who perceive a low level of integrity 
within their city governments tend to be especially dissatisfied 
with local anticorruption endeavors (Song and Cheng  2012 ). In 
addition, Jiang and Yang ( 2016 ) address more specifically how 
anticorruption campaigns affect public support for government 
by exploring the public reaction to the purge of Chen Liangyu, 
the former party secretary of Shanghai. Nevertheless, research 
specifically devoted to the effect of anticorruption campaigns 
on public support is still scant. Moreover, the extant literature 
tends to treat political support as a holistic object, whereas it is 
actually a multidimensional phenomenon (Dalton  1999 ). Making 
distinctions between different dimensions of political support is 
crucial because the distinct definitions and dimensions of political 
support may lead to divergent conclusions (Warren  1999 ; Yang and 
Tang  2010 ). 
 In groundbreaking work on political support, Easton ( 1965 ) 
argues that people express their support for three distinct political 
entities: the authorities, the regime, and political communities. He 
further identifies two types of support: specific support and diffuse 
support (Easton  1975 ). Specific support, largely based on the 
public ’ s perception of the outputs and performance of the political 
authorities, is relatively unstable. Diffuse support, in contrast, is 
“shaped mainly by prolonged socio-psychological forces and is only 
weakly associated with people ’ s spontaneous responses to specific 
policies and the performance of incumbent authority” (Tang and 
Huhe  2014 , 569; Easton  1975 ). Following Easton ’ s work, Dalton 
( 1999 ) classified political support/trust into five categories: political 
community, regime principles, regime performance, regime 
institutions, and political actors. 2 
 According to the foregoing conceptual classification, political 
support stimulated by anticorruption campaigns falls under the 
domain of specific support for the performance achieved by relevant 
government institutions and political leaders. Based on the extant 
studies of political support in China, we further propose to examine 
three layers of political authorities that have been the most relevant 
to initiating and implementing the latest anticorruption campaign: 
the central authority of the party-state; the top party leader 
initiating the campaign (Xi Jinping) and the top leader leading the 
campaign (Wang Qishan); and both the anticorruption agencies 
implementing the campaign and the formal institutions controlling 
corruption. 
 Central Authority of the Party-State 
 Easton ( 1965 ) argues that most political systems require a relatively 
stable set of authorities, which need to be buttressed to at least 
some extent by support. Specific support is mainly manifested in 
people ’ s attitudes toward “what the authorities do and how they do 
it” (Easton  1975 , 437). In a unitary state, the central government 
has ultimate political authority, and subnational units only 
exercise powers that the central government chooses to delegate. 
This contrasts with federal states, in which political authority is 
shared between the federal government and its constituent polities 
(Stephens and Wikstrom  2007 ). Moreover, the hallmark of the 
Chinese unitary state is the fusion of party and state: the party-state 
(Furtak  1986 ). The central authority is dominated by the party 
center, which governs the state through its control of all party cadres 
and government officials (Shirk  1993 ). Thus, people also refer to the 
central authority simply as “the Center” ( zhongyang ), indicating its 
authoritative position in the regime (Li  2013 ). Given that national 
leaders are not popularly elected, “citizens in China usually judge 
the incumbent authority as a whole mainly through the policies 
made and implemented by the authority” (Chen  2004 , 25). Hence, 
for many people, a large-scale anticorruption campaign would be 
viewed as a decision made and guided collectively by the central 
authority of the party-state. The central authority is undoubtedly 
the primary focal point for understanding public support during an 
anticorruption campaign. 
 Top Party Leaders Initiating the Campaign and Leading 
the Campaign 
 Ordinary citizens also tend to personalize political authorities 
(Caprara  2007 ). By studying petitioners to Beijing, Li ( 2013 ) finds 
that people might redefine what constitutes the central authority to 
retain their trust in the government. For some people, the Center is 
highly personalized to include only a few top leaders. Therefore, in 
the case of the anticorruption campaign, we also refine the measure 
of popular support for the central authority to be the two top 
leaders: the top leader who initiated the campaign, Xi Jinping, the 
supreme leader of China, and the top leader who heads the CDIC 
and has led the campaign in practice, Wang Qishan. As discussed 
previously, campaign-style enforcement may centralize power in the 
top leaders, who are, therefore, expected to gather popular support 
through the campaign. 3 
 Anticorruption Agencies Implementing the Campaign 
and Formal Institutions Controlling Corruption 
 While exploring the sources of regime support in China, Yang and 
Tang ( 2010 ) and Dickson ( 2016 ) differentiate institutional support 
by separating it into various political institutions representing 
different government functions. Following this approach, this article 
focuses on the anticorruption agencies, mainly the CDIC and the 
DICs from provincial to county levels that carry out the campaign 
in practice by, for example, conducting investigations, arresting 
officials, and inspecting government departments. In addition to the 
concrete anticorruption actors, public support for formal rules and 
laws regulating corruption in the long run is examined. The efficacy 
of the law and regulations largely relies on public confidence in their 
effectiveness and self-enforced obedience and respect for the rules by 
those who are ruled (Weingast  1997 ). Given that campaigns tend to 
bypass legal institutions it is worth examining how the public views 
the formal rules that over the long run sustain the achievements of 
temporary campaigns. 
 Data and Methods 
 Most extant research on political support analyzes data collected 
through surveys and interviews, which, despite their advantages, 
compromise either timeliness or the ability to reach a wide 
variety of public sentiments. This study uses a big-data approach, 
mainly by web scraping and conducting text analysis of online 
comments about China ’ s latest anticorruption campaign. The 
big-data approach dramatically increases the number and types of 
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observations and variables available for analysis (Grimmer  2015 ; 
Monroe et al.  2015 ; Titiunik  2015 ). 
 We systematically trace online comments about the news reports of 
 each and every corrupt high-ranking official ’ s downfall over a nearly 
three-year time span, as opposed to focusing only on a one-shot 
corruption investigation, as previous studies have done relying on 
surveys. The 370,000 online comments obtained from China ’ s 
major websites constitute a large quantity of data that could not be 
collected in traditional survey studies. More importantly, the online 
comments enable evaluation of people ’ s perceptions of their national 
leaders during the campaign, which has been a taboo question to 
ask in public surveys (Shi  1997 ). 
 The big-data approach also mitigates the reliability problem of 
answering political support questions in an authoritarian context 
during surveys because netizens in China actually enjoy a large 
degree of “freedom of speech” on the internet (King, Pan, and 
Roberts  2013 ). Finally, netizens are indeed “critical citizens” bearing 
particular implications for understanding public opinion and 
potential social mobilization in authoritarian settings because they 
are politically active, better informed, and skeptical of government, 
as shown in the Arab Spring protests (Lynch  2012 ; Norris  1999 ). 
 Data Source 
 Given the apparent difficulty of collecting every single comment 
on every piece of anticorruption news on the internet, we focus on 
netizens ’ comments following the first formal news reports of the 
investigation into the big tigers on China ’ s five major commercial 
news websites: Sina, Sohu, Tencent, Phoenix, and Caixin. The 
primary reason for selecting these five websites is their popularity 
as measured by Alexa ’ s web traffic, engagement, and reputation 
metrics. According to Alexa ’ s 2016 rankings ( http://www.alexa.
com ), Tencent, Sohu, and Sina are the three most popular portal 
news websites in China. Although Phoenix and Caixin are not 
ranked among the top 50 websites in China, Phoenix News, 
sponsored by Phoenix New Media based in Hong Kong, is relatively 
independent of the Chinese government and popular among 
Chinese middle class, and Caixin was a crucial outlet for the first 
release of material about the downfall of corrupt officials in the 
latest campaign. 4 These two websites are therefore also included in 
the analysis. 
 The research is limited to the first 100 “big tigers” investigated by 
the CDIC from December 2012 to April 2015. Notably, although 
the CDIC and news media announced the investigation of one 
civilian official at a time, they typically released anticorruption 
news regarding groups of military leaders. Therefore, the online 
comments of 75 news reports on individual officials and two news 
reports on military leaders were collected from each website. Table 
S1 in the Supporting Information in the online version of this 
article lists the basic information pertaining to these “big tigers.” 
 Because these five websites were designed and developed in different 
ways, the programming language Python was used to develop five 
distinct web-scraping programs for extracting online comments 
about anticorruption news stored in a MySQL database. A total 
of 419,028 comments were collected. Not all of the extracted 
comments were useful for further analysis. First, “blank” comments 
containing no information were deleted. Second, comments with 
garbled messages that could not be decoded in a general Chinese 
operating system were wiped out. Third, when two or more 
identical comments came from one user at exactly the same IP 
address, only one was retained because repeated posts were likely 
to arise either from internet congestion or from other idiosyncratic 
factors. Finally, measures were taken to alleviate concerns about 
the well-known government-recruited commentators, who have 
been dubbed the “50 Cents Party” (Han  2015 ). However, one can 
never be 100 percent certain about the true identity of an online 
commentator. The rule devised in this study was that when a user at 
the same IP address posted more than two comments on the same 
news report within two hours, it was considered a government-
recruited commentator and all of its comments were deleted. 5 
 After filtering, a total of 370,333 comments were left to analyze. 
Figure  1 illustrates the distribution of the comments across the five 
websites. Forty-three percent of the comments in the sample are 
from Tencent, the most popular news media platform in China, 
followed by Sina, Phoenix, Sohu, and Caixin. Figure  2 shows that 
the waves of comments, in both volume and total words, fluctuate 
over time with the downfall of different big tigers. The wave hit its 
peak in July 2014, when a group of high-level officials were arrested 
one after another, including Zhou Yongkang, China ’ s former 
security czar and a Politburo Standing Committee member. 
 Data Analysis and Results 
 The starting point of analysis is to pinpoint the most frequently 
used words ( ci 旽) among all the comments to offer an overview of 
their themes. After filtering out all the stop words and segmenting 
the comments into meaningful words, 6 a total of 2.25 million words 
were contained within the 370,333 comments. In the word cloud 
shown in figure  3.1 , the most frequently used words among all 
comments are displayed in larger sizes. The most frequently used 
words were “corrupt” (柶) and “official” (ᙳ). Other frequently used 
words include “good”/“well” (ቃ), “China” (Ĺ๻), “investigate” 
(⩰), “support” (♡쩓), “anticorruption” (য另), “catch”/“arrest” 
(≁), “hope” (᫶⥞), “tiger” (冾将), and “corruption” (另柱). This 
big picture seems to indicate that most people expressed support for 
investigating corrupt officials, especially the “big tigers.” 
 Figure  3.2 lays out the corresponding absolute counts of these 
high-frequency words and their percentage of the total word count. 
Among these “hot” words, “support” ranked fifth in terms of 
frequency, implying a high level of public support and generally 
 Figure 1  Distribution of Comments across Websites 
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positive attitudes toward the government ’ s anticorruption campaign. 
Notably, figure  3.2 also shows that the words related to China ’ s 
paramount leader, Xi Jinping, such as “Party Secretary General Xi” 
( xizong ŷẨ), “Chairman Xi” ( xizhuxi ŷŊᬤ), and “Uncle Xi” 
( xidada ŷᆼᆼ), were quite commonly used by netizens. 
 Second, we use latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) to detect the 
major themes embodied in the comments. As a classic topic model 
method based on probability theory, LDA identifies the probability 
of different themes appearing in all articles of the collection. 7 
Table  1 reports nine types of meaningful themes with their 
categories, keywords, and representative comments. Apparently, 
positive attitudes, such as showing support, praise, and the value of 
certain political authorities, which we call “affirmative attitudes,” 
account for a sizable weight in all the themes, although there are 
also more critical and sophisticated views such as questioning 
the light punishment imposed on certain officials or the selective 
enforcement of anticorruption campaigns. 
 Correspondingly, figure  4 shows the probability of each comment 
theme appearing in the database. Among the nine types, the 
theme “Support Xi” has the highest probability, 13.37 percent, 
indicating that the top leader Xi Jinping garnered a great deal of 
public support by launching the anticorruption campaign. The 
theme “applauding anticorruption in general” has a probability 
of appearing of 10.54 percent. Another theme with a probability 
of 11.55 percent involves joyful feelings about the campaign 
expressed through Chinese netizens ’ typical words such as “sending 
congratulatory telegrams” while inviting the CDIC to investigate 
their hometowns at the same time. Notably, Chinese netizens also 
expressed their support for institution building to deter corruption 
or at least highlighted party discipline ( dang ji ) and state law ( guo fa ) 
instead of individual leaders in their comments, as manifested in a 
theme with a probability of 10.49 percent. The subsequent analysis 
focuses on comparing affirmative attitudes across individual leaders, 
anticorruption agencies, and formal institutions in the Chinese 
netizens ’ comments. 
 Affi rmative Attitudes toward Different Political Authorities 
 Three steps proceed to measure affirmative attitudes toward 
different political authorities identified in the previous section. First, 
related comments are categorized into three broad types: central 
authority, top leaders, and institutions. The “top leaders” category 
has two subcategories: Xi Jinping and Wang Qishan, whereas the 
“institutions” category is further divided into “anticorruption 
agencies” and “abstract institutions,” including state law and 
party discipline. Then reference words are grouped into their 
corresponding categories. For example, netizens could refer to Xi 
Jinping as Party Secretary Xi ( xizong ), Chairman Xi ( xi zhuxi ), 
Uncle Xi ( xi dada ), and so on. These words are all put under the 
category “Xi Jinping.” In a party-state like China, netizens use 
“center,” “party center,” “CCP central committee,” and “state 
council” to refer the central authority. Table  2 summarizes the 
most frequently used terms in the database for each government 
authority. 
 Finally, we seek to identify affirmative attitudes for each category 
of political authorities. Given the short informal textual messages 
under examination, we use an alternative approach and focus 
exclusively on positive sentiments instead of identifying positive, 
negative, or neutral sentiments, as is common in sentiment 
analysis. This study is particularly interested in the  relative levels 
of affirmative attitudes toward different authorities. We search 
for affirmative words such as “support,” “great,” and “very good,” 
which tend to appear frequently together with words representing 
each political authority in all the comments. We define these words 
as “concomitant affirmative words.” If the words representing one 
political authority are associated with more affirmative words, 
then the netizens presumably expressed more affirmative attitudes 
toward this political authority. Because of the large number of 
 Figure 2  Distribution of Comments Over Time 
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these words, we focus on the top 10 and 20 most frequently 
appearing concomitant affirmative words. Table  3 lists the top 10 
frequent concomitant affirmative words for each political authority 
under study. 
 Figure  5 presents the distribution of affirmative words across 
different political authorities. The bars indicate the absolute count 
of all the words used to refer to each category of political authorities. 
The political authorities with higher columns are mentioned more 
 Figure 3.1  Word Cloud 
 Figure 3.2  Word Frequency 
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 Table 1   LDA Categorization of Comment Themes, Ranked from Low to High Probability 
 Types  Keywords  Sample Comments 
Type 1: Report local 
corruption
琼 (money), ᫀ栐(salary), ↿ᗸ 
(house), ⩰ (check)
ƹ짹쮙盲气ǅ⇞⟶៯綟䇆ᬌ氘੹뺔ェĶ⤼İᫀࣨ栐䇂᝚ᙳᫀːڶᮖញ印ΟᲦĀ䆼ᆪĈ䇂↿
ᗸ뺔印ᲲƱࣦᆪĈ䇂᝚歙뺔Ƞȼ气琼ȗ଴濛⧀੹? Yunnan Zhenxiong is far away from the 
emperor. Small offi cials ’ monthly  salary is only RMB2000. However, they can build  houses 
costing RMB1 million in a few years, and drive cars worth more than RMB200,000. Where did 
they get the  money ? 
Type 2: Promote institution 
building
䈸䌓 (supervision), ㈰ᶫ (law), ܲ
᯳ (institution), 柶ᙳ(corrupt 
offi cials), ⦕ߓ(power), য
另(fi ghting corruption/
anticorruption)
᫶⥞Ā毐য另, Ā毐ߘᴟܲ ᯳ᙚ쨂,㬐ܡᘕŷৢ㒤ీ✤ߘ༈僖๻䦓気弱⦕ߓ䈸䌓઴侴⦸뺔⩰ۛ
䇂⟶Ŵ㫥Āダ뺔柶ᙳ们あ㭱቎俔卂ۮ怌,⦑Ŷ⦑ďᙚ뺔It would be better to improve the 
 institution while  fi ghting corruption , learning from places such as Taiwan, Singapore, and 
the U.S. to  constrain and supervise public power . Those who are investigated are only a 
drop in the bucket.  Corrupt offi cials are like cell division; that is, there is no way to eliminate 
all of them by getting rid of a few. 
Type 3: Applaud 
anticorruption
ᆼḻǾḅ (joyful, exhilarating), 冾
将(big tigers), ๻ᚯ(country), 
᫶⥞(hope), 噫쭐(fl ies)
气ᇁᆼḻǾḅƪ, ᆪ⩰Āǅ冾将噫즟, ⅸȼ๻ᚯ⇞⤽᫶⥞뺔This is very  joyful . There is only  hope 
for our  country if more  tigers and  fl ies are investigated. 
Type 4: Uphold investigations 
on local offi cials
⩰(investigate), 冾䆼ዯ(ordinary 
people), ໄ✴(local), ⦥ᙳ 
(village offi cials), 噫쭐(fl ies)
ⅸȼ淁䇂⦥ᙳŶ⟶ᶨᛚ⤽ď䏣ṪŜ⧀䇂뺔昕⩰뺔旙冾䆼ዯቃ毭㡒뺔 Village offi cials in our area 
are also quite wealthy. It is not clear how they get rich. They should be  investigated , so that 
 ordinary people can have a better life. 
Type 5: Question the 
campaign and corrupt 
offi cials
ފ剆(deputy position), ⿽剆 (chief 
position)
ধ⟶ĀĶފ剆柶ᙳṪŜފ剆湍ቃ柶⿽剆湍㏫᰺!
 Another corrupt  deputy offi cial , how come all offi cials in  deputy positions are corrupt while 
offi cials in  chief positions are clean? 
Type 6: Comments on Ji 
Jianye
짹Ǥ(Nanjing), ∉᪳(Yangzhou), 
ᘐ(ji)
ৠṻ䇂冾ᘐົ∉᪳ᙳㄛ䋕濛冾ᘐ⟶Ķ印ᮓ䇂Ǿâ冾⧃䊪⟶᫨甒ӓઠ䥥ܧ଴ᵒſ无᫨甒ញϙⲭ
 Poor Old  Ji . In the eyes of  Yangzhou people and offi cials, Old  Ji is a capable person! Old Yang is 
nothing but a nail in the mayor ’ s coffi n. He brings nothing but trouble to mayors wherever he 
serves as secretary. 
Type 7: Congratulations and 
invite investigations
栆㽱(congratulatory telegram), ⩰
(check/investigate), 俖Ƴ (fi nally)
俖Ƴ䊏ܧ⤽㑨짹ᙳ੬忠⩰ƪ, 横ŉ㑨짹Ǿ, ົᮩ᪳঵঒栆㽱âŷẨ㑨짹昕ᆪ⩰⩰㏫ⲟ!  Finally a 
Hunan offi cial is  investigated . Being a Hunanese, I am sending my  congratulatory telegram 
from Guangzhou! Boss Xi, Hunan should be investigated more thoroughly. 
Type 8: Advocate severe 
penalties
⨤ソ(execution by shooting), 〟ۻ
(death penalty), ؀温(all), 柶ᙳ
(corrupt offi cials)
 ㏫ᙳ᝞哶ধ᝞, ०์ញ⟶ᆆ傆ᇁ歮柶ᙳ柶ĈȵČ؀温ܗᆆ〟ۻ䣊प쩏弱,ĈȵČܗᆆ➁⥤
ᶶۻ, ĈȵČܗᆆᮖ, ĈȵČܗᆆᮖ, ĈȵČܗᆆᮖ, Ĺ๻䇂ᙳ໐Āč㏫侽ƪ
 The lack of honest offi cials is because of the light penalty. If a  death penalty with immediate 
execution is imposed on  all corrupt offi cials taking Y5 million or more; life imprisonment is 
imposed on corrupt offi cials convicted of graft of Y4 million and above; 20 years imprisonment 
is imposed on those convicted of graft totaling Y3 million or above; sentences of 15 years in 
prison for corrupt offi cials convicted of graft of Y2 million or above; and sentences of 10 years 
imprisonment for corruption totaling Y1 million and above, the Chinese offi cialdom will 
suddenly be clean. 
Type 9: Support Xi, Wang, 
and central government
♡쩓(support), ⊲≖(advocate),
ŷᆼᆼ(Uncle Xi), ŷẨ(Party 
Secretary General Xi), 㲭ſ无
(General Secretary Wang), Ĉ᠍
(long live), 冾将(tiger)
ŷŊᬤ뺓㲭ſ无, ˖ȼ⟶Ĺ๻䇂⚐⟠, ⟶Ǿㄛ䇂⚐⟠, ˖ȼয另柱弱ߣ㏍ᶽĹ๻Ǿㄛ䇂⊲≖, 㳞ົ
偹Č昤ᆼ冾将ȼ憔য⇣, ď憔Ṵâ⤽13ȄĹ๻Ǿㄛ♡좢˖ ȼ, Ā쨹ᆼ冾将湍⟶俆冾将৘憔ὁĀᅬ
৫ȲĹ๻Ǿㄛញ⟶桅㆐楾㟟Ŷɼ⋢˖ȼ䇂⋟䗨ߖâŷŊᬤĈ᠍, 㲭ſ无Ĉ᠍ââ 
 Chairman Xi, General Secretary Wang , you are China ’ s savior, people ’ s savior, your 
anticorruption drive has gained people ’ s support and endorsement. There have been rumors 
on the Internet saying that the big  tigers are planning to launch a counterattack in retaliation. 
Don ’ t be afraid! You have 1.3 billion Chinese people behind you, all the big  tigers are just 
 tigre de papier . Your loyal people await your instruction and are willing to do everything that 
you command!  Long live President Xi and Secretary Wang! 
 Figure 4  Probability of Comment Themes 
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 Figure 5  Distribution of Concomitant Affirmative Words across Political Authorities 
 Table 2   Grouping Words to Corresponding Political Authorities 
 Central Authority of the 
Party-State 
 Top Party Leaders  Institutions 
 Xi Jinping  Wang Qishan  Anticorruption Agencies 
 Abstract Legal institutions 
 State Law  Party Discipline 
 Ĺᇅ 
 Center 
 ŷẨ 
 Party Secretary General Xi 
(Boss Xi) 
㲭ſ无
 Secretary Wang 
Ĺ侸ዱ
 CDIC 
㈰ᶫ
 Legislation 
ש侸๻㈰
 Party discipline and state laws 
שĹᇅ
 Party Center 
 ŷŊᬤ 
 Chairman Xi 
㲭ᠫ៯
 Wang Qishan 
᪹戀俒
 CDIC Inspection Teams 
㈰
 Law 
ש侸
 Party discipline 
Ĺᇅ♹ᯡ
 Central Government 
ŷᆼᆼ
 Uncle Xi 
ᠫ៯ſ无
 Secretary Qishan 
Ĺᇅ侸ዱ
 CDIC 
㈰㈌
 Rule of law 
僺짛棻俍
 Mass line 
 ĹؑĹᇅ 
 CCP central committee 
ŷ氁ᮔ
 Xi Jinping 
㲭Ẩ
 Boss Wang 
Ĺᇅ᪹戀俒
 Central Circuit Inspection Team 
㈰ܲ
 Rule by law 
ש穔
 Party work style 
๻ߙ癏
 State Council 
ŷẨſ无
 Party Secretary General Xi 
冾㲭
 Old Wang 
̫ ㈰㈌๻
 Rule the country by law 
ש穔᰺♹
 Clean party style 
 Table 3   Top 10 Concomitant Affirmative Words 
 Central Authority of 
the Party-State 
 Top Party Leaders  Institutions 
 Xi Jinping  Wang Qishan Anticorruption Agencies 
 Abstract Legal Institutions 
 State Law  Party Discipline 
 ♡쩓 
 Support 
 ♡쩓 
 Support 
 ♡쩓 
 Support 
 ♡쩓 
 Support 
 ♡쩓 
 Support 
♡쩓
 Support 
ቃ
 Good 
殎嚍
 Thanks for the hard work 
ቃ
 Good 
ቃ
 Good 
ቃ
 Good 
ቃ
 Good 
Ĉ᠍
 Long live 
ቃ
 Good 
⊲≖
 Advocate 
 殎嚍 
 Thanks for the hard work 
⊲≖
 Advocate 
Ĉ᠍
 Long live 
ቃ⫠
 Good 
ቃ⫠
 Good 
ༀ٭⊲≖
Strongly support
ߘ㈉
 Keep working 
ༀ٭⊲≖
Strongly support
ᆼḻǾḅ
 Joyful and exhilarating 
⊲≖
 Advocate 
Ĉ᠍
 Long live 
嚞⟆
 Wise 
ቃቃ
 Very Good 
ᆼḻǾḅ
 Joyful and exhilarating 
⊲≖
 Advocate 
ፐ。
Powerful
⊲≖
 Advocate 
ᆼḻǾḅ
 Joyful and exhilarating 
ቃ⫠
 Good 
ቃቃ
 Very Good 
ༀ٭⊲≖
Strongly support 
 ♡쩓˖ 
 Support You 
ߘ㈉
 Keep working 
῵晒
 Thanks 
῵晒
 Thanks 
Ĉ᠍
 Long live 
株
 Praise 
ᆼḻǾḅ
 Joyful and exhilarating 
῵晒
 Thanks 
ቃቃ
 Very Good 
株
 Praise 
嚞⟆
 Wise 
ቃ⫠
 Good 
嚞⟆
 Wise 
ፐ。
 Powerful 
ʂᆼ
 Great 
栆㽱
Congratulations
ʂᆼ
 Great 
科
 Big support 
ʂᆼ
 Great 
嚞⟆
 Wise 
Ĉ᠍
 Long live 
ᆼḻǾḅ
 Joyful and exhilarating 
科
 Big support 
ʂᆼ
 Great 
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often in the netizens ’ comments. As seen in figure  5 , Xi Jinping is 
mentioned most frequently, 30,254 times, among all the political 
authorities. He is followed by the central authority of the party-
state, then Wang Qishan, and the CDIC. Party discipline and laws 
are mentioned the least often, only 3,957 times, which is barely 
one-eighth of the comments made about Xi Jinping. In other words, 
comparing different political authorities, the netizens ’ attention 
was concentrated on the topmost leader, whereas the formal rules 
covering laws and party discipline gained the least attention from 
the public. This finding is consistent with the theoretical analysis 
of the potential drawbacks of campaign-style corruption control in 
which institution building tends to be bypassed and overshadowed 
by the empowered central authority and its leaders. 
 The two lines  show the probability of affirmative sentiments 
for each political authority. Take Xi Jinping as an example. The 
percentage of comments involving the top 10 or 20 concomitant 
affirmative words among all comments (calculated by the number of 
words) mentioning Xi Jinping means, intuitively, what percentage 
of all words referring to Xi are accompanied by affirmative 
words. This is an indicator of the generally supportive attitude 
of the public toward Xi. The lower line  is based on the top 10 
concomitant affirmative words, and the higher line  is based on 
the top 20 concomitant affirmative words. If measured by the top 
10 concomitant affirmative words, the percentage of supportive 
attitudes toward Xi is 70.10 percent, and 87.75 percent if measured 
by the top 20 concomitant affirmative words. Therefore, Xi not 
only gained a lot of attention from the public, but also he won a 
high level of support. 
 Support for the central authority and Wang Qishan is similarly 
high, although not as high as for Xi. Hence, although many central-
level officials were found to be corrupt during the campaign, the 
public nevertheless acknowledged the central authority ’ s effort 
to fight corruption in general. In contrast, the anticorruption 
agencies such as the CDIC or formal institutions such as law and 
party discipline attracted much less attention and limited support 
from the netizens. 9 CDIC receives around 40 percent of public 
support; the public shows even less affirmative sentiments, only 
20 percent, when discussing laws and discipline, indicating much 
less confidence in these institutions as a means of controlling 
corruption. 
 In figure  6 , we further explore how affirmative attitudes toward 
different political authorities change when different big tigers fell 
over time. Essentially, we break down the probability of affirmative 
sentiments obtained in figure  5 for each big tiger to examine how 
affirmative sentiments for each political authority change along with 
the tigers and thus compare affirmative sentiments across different 
political authorities over time. The black line represents affirmative 
sentiment toward Xi, which is significantly higher than the lines 
that represent other political authorities. The gray dashed line and 
black dashed line represent Wang Qishan and the central authority, 
respectively. They are generally lower than the black line but higher 
than the gray and dotted lines, which represent the anticorruption 
agency and law/party discipline, respectively. In addition, the 
highest three lines tend to fluctuate more wildly over different tigers 
than the two lower lines, indicating that public support for these 
three authorities might have depended on the specific tigers. This 
 Figure 6  Change in Affirmative Sentiments across Big Tigers over Time 
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fluctuating trend is strongest for Xi. Some spikes in Xi ’ s affirmative 
sentiments are associated with the downfall of mega tigers such as 
Zhou Yongkang (ZYK), Xu Caihou (XCH), and Ling Jihua (LJH). 
In contrast, affirmative sentiments experience little change over 
time for the anticorruption agency and the formal institutions. 
This finding suggests that cracking down on the “mega tigers” at 
the national level tended to elicit more public support for the top 
leaders. 
 Regression Analysis across Big Tigers 
 To provide more evidence to support this argument, we conduct 
a regression analysis to test the effect of the corrupt officials ’ party 
rank on the affirmative sentiments toward Xi vis-à-vis formal 
institutions (i.e., law/party discipline). The dependent variable 
is the ratio of Xi ’ s support propensity to the formal institutions ’ 
propensity. Xi ’ s (or formal institutions ’ ) support propensity is 
calculated as the number of concomitant affirmative words with Xi 
Jinping (or formal institutions) among the total number of words 
contained in the comments for each tiger. The key independent 
variable is the party rank of a corrupt official. It is a dichotomous 
variable: if a corrupt official was a central committee member or 
above in the party hierarchy, this variable is coded as 1; otherwise, 
it is coded as 0. Figure  7 virtualizes the regression results of two 
model specifications: one is a parsimonious model without control 
variables, and the other is a saturated model with some plausible 
confounders, including the level of education, age, years of party 
membership, bureaucratic level (central or local), and type of 
position (party, government, military, national, local people ’ s 
congress or political consultative conference), and time trends. 
Figure  7 reveals that the party rank in both models with or without 
control variables is statistically significant, suggesting that the higher 
the party rank of the big tiger who was caught, the more public 
support Xi Jinping gained vis-à-vis formal institutions such as the 
law and party discipline. The results are similar for regressions using 
the administrative rank of corrupt officials as the independent 
variable. The coefficients of other control variables are not 
distinguishable from zero. In the Supporting Information online, 
figure S1 presents the results with the affirmative sentiments of Xi 
and institutions analyzed separately; figure S2 presents the results 
with the amount of money involved in corruption in each case as an 
additional control variable. 
 Conclusion 
 This article has examined anticorruption campaigns, a less 
institutionalized anticorruption strategy, to complement previous 
studies that have focused on institutionalized anticorruption 
efforts. It broadens studies of campaign governance beyond 
the policy makers ’ perspective and mind-set (Liu et al.  2015 ) 
to examine broader effects on public opinion. In particular, we 
unbundle public support into three dimensions and use online 
comments about China ’ s unprecedented anticorruption campaign. 
We find that campaign-style enforcement contributes to the 
centralization of power in the central authority and helps its top 
leaders consolidate public support, which could boost the short-
term efficiency of policy implementation. This observation echoes 
research that Chinese people ’ s trust in their top national leaders has 
been highly resilient (Dickson  2016 ; Li  2004 ,  2013 ; Tang  2016 ). 
Specific support for the supreme leader could also fuel diffuse 
support for the regime, especially in an authoritarian regime like 
China ’ s (Dickson  2016 ). In this respect, this research bridges the 
popular top-down and bottom-up perspectives on public policy 
implementation by studying how the general public, who are the 
target population of the anticorruption campaign (i.e., the bottom), 
support different political authorities, who are the top designers of 
the anticorruption policy (i.e., the top) (deLeon and deLeon  2002 ). 
The findings also advance Matland ’ s political implementation 
model by showing that policy implementation outcomes not only 
are “decided by [the] power” of major actors (1995, 163) but also 
can reinforce the power structure of actors and strengthen the 
power of the major policy initiator. On the downside, the pattern 
of the online comments seems to confirm scholars ’ concerns 
about the drawbacks of campaigns, such as the disruption to 
routine administrative procedures and the marginalization of legal 
procedures. Bypassing legal institutions during campaigns may 
result in even less attention being paid to the rule of law in Chinese 
society. In addition, Chinese state media propaganda tends to 
promote the central authority over institutions and may thus further 
increase the difference in public attention and support between top 
leaders and institutions. 
 In contrast, past anticorruption campaigns in Singapore and 
Hong Kong led to the establishment of successful anticorruption 
institutions and increased public trust in government. Their 
experience shows that political leaders ’ strong commitment to 
anticorruption is the primary condition for effective anticorruption 
efforts (Quah  2011 ). Alongside strong commitment, it is equally 
important that leaders use adequate and comprehensive strategies 
to prevent the need and opportunities for corruption (Quah  1999 ). 
In addition, Hong Kong ’ s Independent Commission Against 
Corruption stresses that public trust in the anticorruption agency 
is a crucial determinant of anticorruption effectiveness, particularly 
public trust in the agency ’ s integrity and capacity to control 
corruption in the general environment (Scott  2017 ). This is an 
example of “institution-based trust” ensured by laws and regulations 
(Thomas  1998 ), integral to trust in the general government. 
 In light of these successful experiences, the current Chinese 
administration has shown a rather strong political will for 
 Figure 7  Visualized Regression Results of Big Tigers ’ Party Rank 
on Political Support 
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anticorruption measures. The central authority has also 
acknowledged the importance of “institution building” as an 
anticorruption measure. For example, in a 2015 interview with the 
 Wall Street Journal, Xi noted the importance of institution building 
in anticorruption and maintained: “we must keep power in the 
cage of systemic checks ... As we go further in the anti-corruption 
campaign, we will focus more on institutional building so that 
officials will not dare and cannot afford to be corrupt and, more 
importantly, have no desire to take that course.” However, the 
current anticorruption campaigns have multiple goals. As the current 
study has shown, this can hinder institution building and the rule of 
law. Thus, the top leaders should maintain their composure during 
heated anticorruption campaigns and use the authority garnered 
from the campaign to push institutionalization measures forward, 
for instance, by diverting more resources to institution building 
for long-term prevention and monitoring of corruption. Biddulph, 
Cooney, and Zhu ( 2012 ) discuss the special kind of lawmaking 
that results from campaigns in China. Anticorruption enforcement 
could learn from this model to realize institution building through 
campaigns for long-term desired policy outcomes. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that data-driven methods using the 
big-data approach usually place less emphasis on the role of theory 
and have limited utility for causal inferences (Titiunik  2015 ). 
Nevertheless, the use of big data in this study is theory driven, 
intended to provide empirical evidence to support the existing 
theories on anticorruption campaigns and public support. The data 
patterns are shown to be consistent with the theoretical predictions 
and therefore lend more confidence in the proposed theoretical 
arguments. Future research could use well-designed experiments to 
further explore the causal mechanisms. 
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 Notes 
 1. China ’ s administrative system consists of five government levels: central, 
provincial, prefectural/municipal, county, and township. 
 2. Although political trust and political support carry slightly different meanings, 
they are essentially measures of public confidence in a government and can be 
used interchangeably in most circumstances (Tang  2016 ). 
 3. Because other top leaders such as Premier Li Keqiang do not specialize in 
anticorruption, they are not the focus of this research. We examined people ’ s 
support for Premier Li and found that the comments related to him made up 
only a tiny proportion (approximately 0.2 percent) of the total, indicating that 
Premier Li was not generally viewed by netizens as the major leader of the 
campaign. 
 4. Unlike the four large web portals founded in the late 1990s, Caixin, created in 
2010, mainly targets readers of a well-educated middle class, who are fewer in 
number but more critical. Caixin ’ s editor, Hu Shuli, is also reportedly connected 
to the anticorruption tsar Wang Qishan. The comments from Phoenix and 
Caixin account for approximately 15 percent of the total. The empirical results 
are largely unaffected if these two websites are excluded from the analysis. 
 5. This is a rather strict standard that may have deleted some comments from 
non–50 Cents Party users, such as those involving passionate debates between 
netizens. However, following this standard should only lead to an 
underestimation of support. Moreover, we tried an alternative approach to 
address the concern of the 50 Cents problem. It was reasonable to suspect that 
the government commentators were more likely to comment on multiple 
websites, and even on the same tiger on different platforms, to widely guide 
public opinion. We therefore identified the comments posted by the same IP 
addresses on different websites, on different and the same tigers, detecting 8,115 
and 2,338 comments, respectively. Even assuming these comments were all 
devoted to supporting Xi, the original findings still held. Finally, King, Pan, and 
Roberts ( 2017 ) show that the government commentators mainly comment on 
government and social media websites rather than commercial news portal 
websites. 
 6. Stop words are a set of commonly used words that should be filtered out before 
or after  processing of natural language data. We use  jieba —a Python Chinese 
word segmentation module—for text segmentation. The source codes can be 
found at  https://github.com/fxsjy/jieba . We also add several dictionaries from 
Sogou Pinyin—a popular Chinese input software—to take into account 
abbreviations, cyber speak, nicknames, and so forth. 
 7. See Blei, Ng, and Jordan ( 2003 ). LDA serves the current research purpose better 
than cluster analysis (e.g., K-means). The cluster analysis method categorizes 
documents into different groups by calculating the distance between different 
texts, which is mainly based on the keywords included in each text and the 
frequency of each keyword. However, because short texts (online comments) 
were used in the database, each text has fewer words and a lower keyword 
frequency. Therefore, the accuracy of similarity identification using word 
distances between each text decreases. In addition, cluster analysis does not 
consider the relationship between the keywords in a text, which can lead to 
problems of polysemy (e.g., categorizing the text “There is an apple next to my 
laptop” and “There is an Apple laptop next to me” into one group) and 
synonymy (e.g., failing to categorize the text “long live Uncle Xi” and “Greetings 
to General Xi” into one group). However, LDA, the most popular topic model 
method, can solve these problems. It categorizes polysemous keywords into 
different themes and synonymous keywords into the same theme. The source 
codes used for analysis are from GitHub:  https://github.com/a55509432/
python-LDA . 
 8. We are aware that measuring support by the frequency of certain affirmative 
words such as “good” could lead to inaccurate results. To gauge the percentage 
of negative comments with the word “good,” two sets of positive comments 
related to Xi Jinping, consisting of 2,000 comments in each data set, were 
randomly selected and manually coded by two research assistants. They find 
that negative comments only account for 4.5 percent and 4.6 percent of all 
comments in the two sets, respectively. For the exploratory analysis shown in 
figure  5 , even if 4 percent to 5 percent of misclassified comments were taken 
into account, the key findings would hold because Xi has an overwhelmingly 
high level of support. 
 9. The measurement is based on the total number of words instead of the total 
number of comments. One comment may include several affirmative words so 
that this method takes into account the strength of support for each comment 
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